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5. Lies, Puns, Tallies: Marital and Material Deceit
in Langland and Chaucer
By J a m i e T a y l o r

Augustine tells us that any lie must be always and universally despised, and throughout the Middle Ages, theologians and philosophers adhered to this hard-line stance.
His De mendacio and Contra mendacium deﬁne a lie as an intentional deception:
that is, “any utterance whatever with the will to deceive” (quaelibet enuntiatio cum
voluntate fallendi).1 Even as discussions of lying expanded in the thirteenth century,
as pastoral writers such as William Peraldus and Robert Mannyng named and deﬁned an incredible variety of “sins of the tongue,” intention remained at the heart
of lying in all forms.2 These pastoral texts, Edwin D. Craun succinctly explains, “simply assume that spoken words are associated sufﬁciently in our minds with things,
conceptions, and other signs that can direct us to them—or help us recollect them,
as Augustine would insist.”3 Lying was not only a deliberate act, it functioned within
a strict signiﬁcation system in which word and res were tightly woven together.
But medieval scholastics and pastoral writers recognized other forms of language
in which word and res might not be so clearly or necessarily fused, and they debated
the sinfulness of equivocation and other such verbal dissimulations and complexities.4 Equivocation came into the scholastic picture through logic, in which aequivocum denoted polysemy and homonymy, without the pejorative senses that attached
to mendacium.5 In his discussion of Aristotle, for example, Boethius notes that
things might go by more than one name; and later thinkers such as Petrus Alphonsus
and Roger Bacon agree that a word might serve more than one meaning (consigniﬁcatio).6 Read next to Augustine’s clear denunciation of mendacious speech, these
philosophical discussions of equivocation expose critical ﬁssures in medieval thinking about deception: that is, how to contend with the unavoidably imperfect relationship between word and referent while also remaining dedicated to strict moral
codes about lying.
Signiﬁcantly, thirteenth- and fourteenth-century pastoral writers often articulated
the inadequate equations between thing and sign by turning to economic and monetary metaphors. These metaphors express worry about the conditions under which
clear links between intention, sign, and res might be disaggregated, maliciously or

1
Augustine, De mendacio 4.4, trans. H. Browne, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: First Series, ed.
Philip Schaff, 14 vols. (Buffalo, NY, 1887), 3:458.
2
Edwin D. Craun, Lies, Slander, and Obscenity in Middle English Literature: Pastoral Rhetoric and
the Deviant Speaker, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 31 (Cambridge, UK, 1997).
3
Ibid., 40.
4
Dallas G. Denery II, “Biblical Liars and Thirteenth-Century Theologians,” in The Seven Deadly
Sins: From Communities to Individuals, ed. Richard Newhauser, Studies in Medieval and Reformation
Traditions 123 (Leiden, 2007), 111–28.
5
E. J. Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,”
Medieval Studies 54 (1992): 94–135.
6
Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattor, PL 64:164–65.
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not. Thus William Peraldus opens his encyclopedic discussion of sins of the tongue
by claiming that liars counterfeit the “coin of truth” and pass it off to unsuspecting
people. Merchants, he says, are especially dedicated liars, since they “show one thing
and sell another, as happens among scribes who exhibit a good handwriting and then
write a sloppy one.”7 Peraldus’s analogy here builds on longstanding associations between coinage and poetry, both of which rely upon and worry about exchange value
between res and sign based on mutual agreement rather than anything intrinsic
or stable.8
The parallel between scribal production and commercial deceit articulated by
Peraldus surfaces in both Langland’s Piers Plowman and Chaucer’s “Shipman’s
Tale” as a complex pun on “tallying.” Although Piers and the “Shipman’s Tale”
are very different texts (in terms of audience, genre, and tone), Langland and Chaucer both exploit the polysemy of Middle English verb taille to explore how material
texts might function as coin-like agents of deception. Taille means the act of tallying,
or recording and reconciling, debts; tale or tale-telling (that is, both the object and
the process); and, more crassly, a woman’s genitals or back end (her “tail”). The
term can thus express conceptual overlaps between sexual, marital, and commercial
equivalences and forms of valuation. In both Piers Plowman and the “Shipman’s
Tale,” these overlaps offer an opportunity to think through how texts themselves
might be understood as tools of equivocation, making equations between res and
sign seem natural or obvious when they are anything but.
Examining these two instances of a “tally-tale-tail” pun helps widen our scope of
what constitutes deception by considering the ways lies might mask themselves as
polysemy and vice versa. More speciﬁcally, it alerts us to how vernacular poets understood material texts within a culture of increasingly complex forms of commercial transactions and valuations. Langland voices his tallying pun through Conscience, who sneers with misogynistic venom at Lady Mede’s argument that gift
giving can be honest and virtuous.9 For Langland, the economic and bodily pun exposes anxieties about the ways a material text might operate both as sign and res,
obscuring meaning and exchange value even as it asserts both. Chaucer uses the
same pun in the “Shipman’s Tale,” when the merchant’s wife scoffs at her husband’s
dismay about her illicit affair with his friend.10 There, in contrast to Piers Plowman,
the pun permits a merchant’s wife to partially liberate herself from the misogynistic
stranglehold that sustained stereotypes of women as deceptive, seductive objects of
exchange.

7
“Sextum malum est aliud ostendere et aliud uendere, sicut accidit in scriptoribus qui bonam litteram
ostendunt et deinde prauam scribunt,” William Peraldus, Summa de vitiis, Tractatus de avaritia, Lyon,
Bibliothèque municipal, MS 678, fol. 47ra. I am grateful to Richard Newhauser for alerting me to this
citation as well as to the forthcoming translation and edition by Siegfried Wenzel, Bridget Balint, Edwin
D. Craun, and Richard Newhauser.
8
Eliza Zingesser, “The Value of Verse: Storytelling as Accounting in Froissart’s Dit du ﬂorin,” Modern
Language Notes 125 (2010): 861–72; see also R. Allen Shoaf, Dante, Chaucer, and the Currency of the
Word: Money, Images, and Reference in Late Medieval Poetry (Norman, OK, 1983).
9
Andrew Galloway, The Penn Commentary on “Piers Plowman”, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 2006), 310–11.
10
Diane Cady, “The Gender of Money,” Genders 44 (2006), https://www.colorado.edu/genders
archive1998-2013/2006/12/01/gender-money.
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Puns are, of course, different from lies.11 Still, like lying, punning relies on intention, as Latin rhetorical treatises such as the Rhetorica ad Herennium explain.12 But
because puns rely also on recipient recognition—that is, a reader or hearer must
“get” the pun—authorial intention cannot provide a fully reliable or holistic metric
for establishing either its sanctity or utility. To account for such interpretive openness, many texts turned to marginal illustrations and maniculae to visually emphasize, explain, or interpret a pun, such that the page itself could be considered crucial
to a pun’s functionality. “Thus mis-takeable words put speakers’ intentions at the
mercy of the gods,” explains Jennifer Bryan, “and written texts at the mercy of
book-makers and book-owners.”13 The material text thus could be a critical “translation” mechanism between authorial intention and readerly comprehension. But
it could also be a dangerous tool, subject to scribal duplicity and coin-like mystiﬁcation.
Tallying is an old accounting practice, reaching back to early bookkeeping and
recording systems when wooden sticks were notched, divided, and distributed to
those involved in an exchange. Putting the sticks back together properly enacted
a complete and accurate transaction.14 In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
tallies began to function as promissory notes rather than records of exchanges, becoming a kind of “tale-telling.” As Tony Moore explains, “the key change was that
the tally was not issued directly to the accountant after he appeared at the Exchequer of Receipt with proof that he had paid money, either into the treasury or to
an assigned recipient. . . . Rather the tally was ﬁrst delivered to the creditor at the
Exchequer of Receipt before he had received any money from the accountant.”15
Such future-oriented tallying came with several problems, particularly when such
tallies were not fulﬁlled (that is, when the payer failed to pay). In those cases, tallies
were translated into “ﬁctitious loans” by which cancelled, unpaid tallies were formulated as ongoing debts. A ﬁctitious loan was “a book-keeping entry, a ﬁction designed in the interest of clerks and creditors, to emend a ﬁction.”16 Edward III ushered in the height of ﬁctitious loans in the 1340s and 1350s, when he struggled
to maintain the ﬁnancial health of the realm. Around the same time, double-entry
bookkeeping, by which credits and debts were recorded to include pending ﬁnancial
exchanges, developed to account for the complexities of international trade. Because double-entry bookkeeping permitted calculations of future resources and debts
in addition to credits and exchanges already performed, it was, as John Ganim puts
it, “a form of rhetoric as well as a technique.”17 Late medieval modes of tallying and
11
Jennifer Bryan, “‘A Berd! A Berd!’: Chaucer’s Miller and the Poetics of the Pun,” Studies in the
Age of Chaucer 38 (2016): 1–37.
12
Ibid., 9.
13
Ibid., 15.
14
M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066–1307 (Cambridge, MA, 1979),
96; see also Richard Firth Green, A Crisis of Truth: Literature and Law in Ricardian England, The
Middle Ages Series (Philadelphia, 2002), 53.
15
Tony Moore, “‘Score It upon My Taille’: The Use (and Abuse) of Tallies by the Medieval Exchequer,” Reading Medieval Studies 39 (2013): 1–18, at 11.
16
G. L. Harriss, “Fictitious Loans,” Economic History Review, n.s., 8/2 (1955): 187–99, at 187.
17
John M. Ganim, “Double Entry in Chaucer’s ‘Shipman’s Tale’: Chaucer and Bookkeeping before
Pacioli,” Chaucer Review 30/3 (1996): 294–305, at 296.
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double-entry bookkeeping straddled the line between sign and res, in that they both
recorded exchange events and shaped how those events might proceed. A pun between tallying and tale-telling was thus structured into the process itself.
For Langland, the complex overlaps between tallies and tales point to the ways
writing might be an exercise in ﬁctitious accounting, in that it can only tenuously
link sign and res, especially with respect to divine truth and salviﬁc promise. Notably, in Piers Plowman the many “fals folk, and feithlees, theves and lyeres” are often
peddlers, merchants, or sellers, such as Envy, who brokers sales among burgesses
in London, and Rose the Regrater, who dupes ale drinkers with subpar product
(IX.119).18 Although Langland worries throughout Piers Plowman about material
corruption and the salviﬁc limitations of human expression, his most extended and
profound investigation of the relationship between lying, intention, and exchange
occurs in the Mede passus (II–IV), just after the dreamer encounters Holy Church
in the ﬁrst visio.19 Holy Church counsels the dreamer that to save his soul, he must
recognize that “whan alle tresors arn tried, treuthe is the beste” (I.85). Casting
about to try to understand truth (at least in its most general outlines), the dreamer
begs her to teach him the opposite, the nature of lies: “Kenne me by som crafte to
knowe the false” (II.4). In answer, Holy Church gestures to the crowd milling around
them, suggesting that they are surrounded by liars. Just as she points out False and
Favel loitering to their left, Lady Mede appears, to the wonder of the dreamer and to
the disdain of Holy Church. Gaudily attired, she easily displays her wealth:
Fetisliche hire fyngres were fretted with golde wyr,
And thereon rede rubies as rede as any gleede,
And diamaundes of derrest pris and double manere saphires,
Orientales and ewages envenymes to destroye.
Hire robe was ful riche, of reed scarlet engreyned,
With ribanes of reed golde and of riche stones.
(II.11–16)

Holy Church explains that this stunning woman is “Mede the mayde,” a bastard
whose father is a liar with a “ﬁkel tonge” (II.25). Moreover, she is slated to marry
Fals Fikel-Tonge, a union orchestrated by Favel and Liar.20 Holy Church warns
the dreamer to guard his conscience, lest he be seduced by Lady Mede’s lies and artiﬁce; she then leaves him to fall asleep.
The proliferation of terms to describe deception in this scene—from “ﬁkel-tonge”
to “fals” to “favel” to “liar”—produces the unsettling sense that deceptive speech
is not only everywhere, it is hard to deﬁne. In other words, the multiplicity and ambiguity of the terms and ﬁgures for falsehood (wordplay that works much like punning) enacts the troubling recognition that deceit can only be inadequately expressed

18
All Piers Plowman quotations are taken from the B-text in The Vision of “Piers Plowman”, ed.
A. V. C. Schmidt (London, 1978), cited parenthetically by passus and line number.
19
James Simpson, “Spirituality and Economics in Passus I–VII in the B-Text of Piers Plowman,”
Yearbook of Langland Studies 1 (1987): 83–103.
20
See Elizabeth Robertson, “Measurement and the ‘Feminine’ in Piers Plowman: A Response to Recent Studies of Langland and Gender,” in William Langland’s “Piers Plowman”: A Book of Essays
(New York, 2001), 167–94.
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and recognized in language. In addition, we must note that even Holy Church acknowledges that Mede is not a liar per se but rather a liar by association: speciﬁcally,
through genealogy and marriage.21 Critics have long recognized both the absence
of Mede’s intentions regarding her own marriage as well as the obvious ways Mede
is both object and agent of circulatory value, both a woman and a term transferred
among men.22 From the point of view of equivocation, Mede is polysemous, a ﬁgure
that attaches to various meanings and conditions without the nefarious intentio required for lying. Were she to be attached to someone like Fals Fikel-Tonge, however, she would be caught in a marriage that would render her deceptive regardless
of her intentions.23
The dream begins with the preparations for Mede’s wedding to Fals, depicting an
enormous crowd gathering to witness and authorize it. The implication here is that
lying transcends social class and occupation: the crowd includes “alle manere of men,”
although it is particularly full of legal bureaucrats such as clerks, assizers, summoners, and sheriffs (II.57–61). Simony and Civil seem especially cozy with Mede, and
they both accept money to perform the service. In addition, to authenticate the ceremony, Liar produces a charter that documents Guile’s approval of Mede’s marriage. But the charter actually exposes the material greed at the heart of the marriage:
“Witeth and witnesseth, that wonieth upon erthe, / That Mede is ymaried moore for
hire goodes / Than for any vertue or fairnesse or any free kynde” (II.75–77).24 The
charter thus codiﬁes the troubling relationship between material and marital exchange, in which virtue or consent masks greed. In doing so, it inaugurates a problem
that plagues the Mede passus: that is, how do material texts, particularly those designed to make meaning and exchange formulaic and stable, inevitably participate in
a system of equivocation, even deception?
21
M. Teresa Tavormina, Kindly Similitude: Marriage and Family in “Piers Plowman”, Piers Plowman
Studies 11 (Cambridge, UK, 1995), 1, points out that Langland clariﬁes Meed’s associational status in his
emendations. In A.2.15, the dreamer asks Holy Church, “What is this womman?,” whereas in the B-text
he asks, “What she was and whos wif she were,” and ﬁnally in the C-text he asks, “Whos wyf a were and
what was here name.” See also D. Vance Smith, “The Labors of Reward: Meed, Mercede, and the Beginnings of Salvation,” Yearbook of Langland Studies 8 (1994): 127–54.
22
John A. Yunck, The Lineage of Lady Meed: The Development of Mediaeval Venality Satire (Notre
Dame, 1963); Elizabeth Fowler, “Misogyny and Economic Person in Skelton, Langland and Chaucer,”
Spenser Studies 10 (1992): 245–74; and “Civil Death and the Maiden: Agency and the Conditions of Contract in Piers Plowman,” Speculum 70/4 (1995): 760–92; Clare A. Lees, “Gender and Exchange in Piers
Plowman,” in Class and Gender in Early English Literature: Intersections, ed. Britton G. Harwood and
Gillian R. Overing (Bloomington, 1994), 112–30; Joan Baker and Susan Signe Morrison, “The Luxury of
Gender: Piers Plowman and The Merchant’s Tale,” Yearbook of Langland Studies 12 (1998): 31–63; and
Masha Raskolnikov, “Promising the Female, Delivering the Male: Transformations of Gender in Piers
Plowman,” Yearbook of Langland Studies 19 (2005): 81–105.
23
James Hala, “‘For She is Tikel of Hire Tale’: Word-Play in the Lady Mede Episode of Piers Plowman
B,” Proceedings of the PMR Conference 14/1 (1989): 99–126.
24
Emily Steiner, Reading “Piers Plowman” (Cambridge, UK, 2013), 45, argues that this charter gestures to another discourse found in medieval historical writing, in which “women who make too great
a mark on political life tend to be accused of improvidence or licentiousness; conversely, these accusations
have huge explanatory power, explaining how women can be historical actors in the ﬁrst place, worthy of
record.” Thus, Steiner notes, scholars sometimes compare Meed and Alice Perrers, Edward III’s mistress.
See also Stephanie Trigg, “The Trafﬁc in Medieval Women: Alice Perrers, Feminist Criticism, and Piers
Plowman,” Yearbook of Langland Studies 12 (1998): 5–29.
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The rest of the passus describes an absurd collection of the characters marching
to Westminster for the wedding: Fals, Favel, and Mede join notaries, summoners, Simony, and Civil, all led by Guile, while Sothnesse rides ahead to warn Conscience
about the retinue about to arrive in the king’s court. When the crowd arrives in Westminster, the king instructs Conscience to put Fals, Favel, Liar, and Guile in jail, so the
crowd of men ﬂanking Mede ﬂees, leaving her to face the court alone. The king offers
her a chamber in which she can await her trial, and there she is approached by a confessor who promises her salvation in exchange for funding to reglaze a window in the
church. In a stunning response, Mede agrees to renovate the church if the confessor
agrees to forgive lechery:
“Wist I that,” quod the womman, “I wolde noght spare
For to be youre frende, frere, and faile yow nevre
While ye love lordes that lecherie haunten,
And lakketh noght ladies that loven wel the same.
It is a freletee of ﬂesshe—ye fynde it in bokes—
And a cours of kynde, wherof we comen alle.
Who may scape the sclaundre, the scathe is soone amended;
It is synne of the sevene sonnest relessed.
Have mercy,” quod Mede, “of men that it haunteth,
And I shal covere youre kirk, youre cloistre do maken,
Wowes do whiten and wyndowes glazen,
Do peynten and portraye (who paied) for the makynge,
That every segge shall see I am suster of youre hous.”
(III.51–63)

Mede uses “haunten” twice, subtly linking lecherous urges to material greed, since
“haunten” means to covet both sex and goods.25 Moreover, when she agrees to reglaze and whitewash the church, she offers a plethora of verbs to demonstrate the
number of equivocal terms to describe the processes (“covere,” “maken,” “whiten,”
“glazen,” “peynten,” “portraye”). Like the unsettling multiplicity of terms and ﬁgures for falsehood depicted when Mede is introduced to the dreamer, here the multiplicity of terms unsettlingly suggests that material objects (windows and walls)
might be vehicles for equivocation and polysemy, or perhaps even deceit.
Indeed, the activities most desired by the confessor—particularly whitewashing—
can themselves be recognized as forms of textual deception. As David Coley has
shown, glazing was conceptually close to glossing, a textual activity potentially illuminating or obfuscating, revealing or misleading.26 The dreamer thus excoriates
Mede’s idea that she might be englazed (or glossed) into the window, since “Ac God
Middle English Dictionary, s.v. “haunten (v. (1)),” 3b–c, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/med/.
David Coley, “‘Withyn a Temple Ymad of Glas’: Glazing, Glossing, and Patronage in Chaucer’s
House of Fame,” Chaucer Review 45/1 (2010): 59–84. The ﬁfteenth-century debate poem “Meed and
Much Thank” overtly and pejoratively sees mede as a form of glossing, repeatedly calling the richly
dressed (and male) Meed a “gloser” and a ﬂatterer. See Twenty-Six Political and Other Poems (Including “Petty Job”) from the Oxford MSS. Digby 12 and Douce 322, ed. J. Kail, Early English Text Society, o.s., 124 (London, 1904), 6–9. For an important discussion of the multiplicity of glossing as an
authorial and compilatory activity, see Alastair Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic
Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1984), 190–204.
25
26
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to alle good folk swich gravynge defendeth—/ To writen in wyndowes of hir weldedes—/ An venture pride be peynted there, and pomp of the worlde” (III.64–6).
Whitewashing involves duplicity more overtly. Juliet Fleming explains that whitewash (a combination of lime, water, and glue) freshened wall surfaces by painting
over scenes of writing or drawing, thereby covering, rather than erasing, older text.27
Critically, then, whitewash is a form of preservation as much as erasure, a representational economy in which something might be hidden but present at the same time
as something new is produced. To use Mede’s term, whitewashing might be understood as a form of textual “haunting,” and it exposes the inevitable equivocation
at the heart of textual production (in that texts can obfuscate and reveal at the same
time). And to extend her logic, such textual haunting must be forgiven, since it, like
the haunting of lechery, is merely a “freletee of ﬂesshe” and “a course of kynde”
(III.55–56). She thus subtly argues that we must forgive and accept the equivocation
performed by material texts. She recognizes the ways material texts, ﬁnancial exchanges, even language itself can operate “deceptively,” in that they can reveal res
and intention even as they misrepresent or cover over them, and she suggests such
deception should not necessarily be condemned. Still, the dreamer pushes against
Mede’s call for forgiveness, and he worries that whitewashing and glazing both
might obscure not just older texts, but conscience itself (even though he promises that
God cannot be duped by these material processes). “For God knoweth thi conscience
and thi kynde wille, / Thi cost and thi coveitise and who the catel oughte,” he warns.
“Forthi I lere yow lordes, leveth swiche werkes” (III.67–69).
Ultimately, the king fetches Mede from her bower and offers Conscience as a potential husband, suggesting that Mede’s circulatory ﬂexibility and her potential to
be fastened to liars might thus be obviated, since conscience, as Isidore of Seville reminds us, always unites thought, sign, and res.28 Although Mede agrees to the union,
Conscience angrily refuses. His multiple insults turn on a “tale-tail” pun, emphasizing its crassness to focus particularly on Mede as a peddler of lechery and lies alike.
“She is frele of hire faith and ﬁkel of hire speche,” he says, “And maketh men mysdo
many score tymes” (III.122–23). She manipulates people’s trust through treasure;
she teaches both wives and widows to be wanton; she poisons popes and impairs
Holy Church. He continues, “For she is tikel of hire tail, talewis of hir tonge, / As
commune as the cartwey to (knaves and to alle)—/ To monkes, to mynstrales, to
meseles in hegges” (III.131–33).
The argument between Mede and Conscience is an argument about the virtues
and pitfalls of equivocation, which affects both Mede and Conscience. Indeed, Conscience is especially subject to equivocation, as Langland points out in passus XV.
Citing Isidore, he tells us that Anima is also known as Animus, Mens, Memoria, Ratio, Reason, Sensus, Conscience, Amor, and Spiritus, depending on the context, and
he notes that Conscience/Anima is “a sotil thyng withalle—/ Oon withouten tonge
and teeth” (XV.12–13). Conscience’s misogynistic anger directed at Mede thus
whitewashes over his recognition that, like Mede, he has no intrinsic or natural value,
but rather exists within an ongoing program of signiﬁcatory exchange and contexJuliet Fleming, “Whitewash and the Scene of Writing,” Shakespeare Studies 28 (2000): 133–38.
Liber sententiarum, PL 83:634. See the citation and discussion of Isidore in Green, A Crisis of
Truth, 113–14.
27
28
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tual circulation. Personiﬁcation allows Langland to animate the costs of equivocation: Mede’s bodily res becomes subject to crude, misogynistic dismissal, and Conscience’s bodily res is partial, open, incomplete.29 Indeed, the multiplicity of terms
that describe but never perfectly reﬂect conscience exposes how personiﬁcation, like
equivocals, can only approximate their referents. Both Mede and Conscience turn to
the material text itself—a glazed window, a whitewashed wall, or a Bible page—to
try to anchor themselves and their authority to something “real” or “stable.” But
Langland repeatedly reveals the material text to be deceptively seductive, a crucial
instrument of, but unavoidable impediment to, the “tresor” Holy Church dangles
in front of the dreamer.
In his “Shipman’s Tale,” Chaucer addresses the same problem—that is, the fragile
equivocations between truth, exchange, and language—by deploying the very same
pun. But he offers a playful rather than anxious take on it. For Chaucer, equivocation provides interpretive opportunities rather than reveals the devastating inadequacies of human expression and the material page. Marital deception is structurally
central to the “Shipman’s Tale,” a fabliau in which a merchant from St.-Denis is
cuckolded by his wife and friend, the monk Daun John. In addition, the mercantile
milieu of the tale suggests Chaucer means to tie fabliau deception directly to commercial deceit. As Roger Ladd points out, “Chaucer portrays merchants outside
The General Prologue as consistently failing to receive or produce the truth value
of reliable discourse.”30 Indeed, although Chaucer describes his merchant as a “worthy man” and notes that “so estatly was he of his governaunce,” he also says he cannot remember his name: “But sooth to seyn, I noot how men hym calle” (“General
Prologue,” 279, 281, 284).31 Chaucer calls attention to the ways the merchant slips
beyond his own powers of language to indicate that merchants especially expose the
inevitable distance between res and sign. In contrast, Chaucer’s portrait of the Shipman emphasizes his ability to narrate and record (and thus stabilize in text) ephemeral currents: “But of his craft to rekene wel his tydes, / His stremes and his daungers
hym bisides, / His herberwe and his moone, his lodemenage, / Ther nas noon swich
from Hull to Cartage” (“General Prologue,” 401–5). Still, despite the Shipman’s
powers of “reckoning,” Chaucer notes, “Of nyce conscience took he no keepe”
(“General Prologue,” 398).32 For Chaucer’s Shipman, as for Langland’s Conscience,
the unifying force of conscience does not provide a fail-safe metric by which data can
be fully “rekened.”
Like the Mede passus, the “Shipman’s Tale” begins by establishing the frictions
between valuation and exchange via a woman’s beauty and courtesy: “Swiche salutaciouns and contenaunces / Passen as dooth a shadwe upon the wal. / But wo is hym
29
James J. Paxson, “Gender Personiﬁed, Personiﬁcation Gendered, and the Body Figuralized in Piers
Plowman,” Yearbook of Langland Studies 12 (1998): 65–96.
30
Roger A. Ladd, “The Mercantile (Mis)reader in the Canterbury Tales,” Studies in Philology 99/1
(2002): 17–32, at 18.
31
All Chaucer citations are taken from The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson et al., 3rd ed.,
with a new foreword by Christopher Cannon (New York, 1987), and cited parenthetically in the text
by fragment and line number.
32
For a discussion of the multiplicity of the term rekene, particularly alongside taille, in Middle English,
see Jonathan Hsy, Trading Tongues: Merchants, Multilingualism, and Medieval Literature, Interventions:
New Studies in Medieval Culture (Columbus, OH, 2013), 46–47.
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that payen moot for al!” (7.8–10). The wife’s social currency is mere “shadow,” something for which the merchant persistently pays (that is, ﬁnancially and emotionally)
but for which he receives nothing substantial in return. Just as Mede’s recognition
of lechery as a kind of “haunting” situates a woman’s body as the cornerstone of
the relationship between material exchange and erotic desire, so too does the wife’s
“shadowy” physical beauty and courtesy reveal how ineffable desires can only be incompletely translated into material objects. In contrast, Chaucer describes the monk’s
hospitality gifts as “some manere honest thyng”; that is, they are actual items that are
not duplicitous because they do not refer to shadowy ideals beyond themselves (7.49).
The tale’s opening salvo about the female body as shadowy object of exchange is
comically realized when Daun John and the wife collude behind the merchant’s
back. As the wife forlornly wanders in her garden one morning, Daun John asks
her what’s wrong. She responds with a standard fabliau complaint: “‘In al the
reawme of France is ther no wyf / That lasse lust hath to that sory pley,’” she says
(7.116–17). The ensuing conversation is so full of oath taking, in which the monk
and wife repeatedly promise one another to keep their complaints secret from the
merchant, that we must assume their intentions are to deceive one another. And indeed, after suggesting she might ﬁnd sexual satisfaction elsewhere, the wife tells
Daun John she needs one hundred francs to pay for new church clothes, which he
readily promises. Then he grabs her:
This gentil monk answerede in this manere:
“Now trewely, myn owene lady deere,
I have,” quod he, “on yow so greet a routhe
That I yow swere and plighte yow my trouthe
That whan youre housbonde is to Flaundres fare
I wol delyvere yow out of this care.
For I wol brynge yow an hundred frankes.”
And with that word he caughte hire by the ﬂankes
And hire embraceth harde and kiste hire ofte.
(7.195–203)

Helen Fulton points out that the negotiation between the monk and the wife “exactly
parallels the bill of exchange,” a formal loan system in which one party receives a
loan in one currency and the other party repays the loan elsewhere in a different
currency.33 The two currencies here, “frankes” and “ﬂankes,” are rhymed to insist
on their close exchangeability. Yet by turning to the bill of exchange as a model,
Chaucer challenges any all-too-easy equation of francs and ﬂanks. Because the currencies transferred by bills of exchange were by deﬁnition different, they could never
be perfectly equated, and such loans were especially vulnerable to unpredictable ﬂuctuations in exchange rates. Savvy merchants could make a proﬁt by manipulating the
difference in their favor. Like a merchant proﬁting from the differences in exchange
rates, the wife proﬁts from her recognition that francs will never be able to be reckoned with ﬂanks, an inequality the monk fails to see.
33
Helen Fulton, “Mercantile Ideology in Chaucer’s Shipman’s Tale,” Chaucer Review 36/2 (2002):
311–22, at 318. See also Kenneth S. Cahn, “Chaucer’s Merchants and the Foreign Exchange: An Introduction to Medieval Finance,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 2 (1980): 81–119.
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When the merchant ﬁnally confronts his friend’s and his wife’s duplicity, the wife
scoffs at his outrage by turning to the marital debt as a source of self-possession and
enjoyment alike. First, she says, he can reconcile any debts and losses on her “taille,”
taking advantage of the “tally-tail” pun to recuperate the kind of agency Mede never
seems to be able to assert. The wife then tells him to laugh and enjoy the fact that her
body can settle any unequal exchanges or ﬁnancial losses:
. . . And if so be I faille,
I am youre wyf: score it upon my taille,
And I shal paye as soone as ever I may.
For by my trouthe, I have on myn array
And nat on wast bistowed every deel.
And for I have bistowed it so weel
For youre honour, for Goddes sake, I seye
As be nat wrooth, but lat us laughe and pleye.
Ye shal my joly body have to wedde.
By God, I wol nat paye yow but a bedde.
(7.415–25)

Her cavalier scoff that he should “score” her wifely loyalty upon her “taille” reclaims Conscience’s devastating “tail-tally-tale” pun by putting her own “joly body”
at the center of it. In doing so, she demonstrates her understanding of the personiﬁcation poetics that trap Mede in a loop of polysemous equivocations. This wife is
likewise trapped, but she can at least recognize the mercantile, circulatory structures
that ensnare her and use them to pursue her own pleasures.
In the end, the merchant forgives his wife for her indiscretions and asks her to be
more modest in her generosity: “‘Now wyf,’ he seyde, ‘and I foryeve it thee, / But by
thy lyf, ne be namoore so large. / Keepe bet oure good that yeve I thee in charge!’”
(7.431–33). With that, the Shipman neatly ends his tale, promising more stories in
the future by deploying the accounting model of ﬁctitious tallies. “Thus endeth my
tale, and God us sende / Taillynge enough unto oure lyves ende. Amen” (7.434–35).
Here, he reprises the “tally-tale” pun to ask for sufﬁcient tales to last until death so
that the end-of-life accounting at Judgment Day will work in their favor.34 The pun
thus suggests a kind of sufﬁciency that can attach to tallies as much as to tales, claiming that both tallies and tales can solve the problem of equivocals by recalibrating
incomplete or unequal relations to make them exchangeable. In other words, it
seems to smooth over the gaps structured into the process of tallying.
However, although the most obvious sense of the ﬁnal line is to promise enough
tale-telling until our lives’ end, the term “lyves” might also be understood as “leaves,”
the material pages of a book. Read this way, that there will be “taillynge enough”
until our leaves’ end, the Shipman’s ﬁnal line becomes a kind of rejection of Conscience’s sneering insult at the end of passus III. For Conscience, Mede’s inability
to read to the end of her proof text exempliﬁes her troubling open-endedness, suggesting that the text’s end, and thus its ﬁnal and stable meaning, has yet to come.
34
Deathbed judgments were often formulated through accounting language, in which sins and virtues were “tabulated” and “reconciled.” See Rosemary O’Neill, “Counting Sheep in the C-Text of
Piers Plowman,” Yearbook of Langland Studies 29 (2015): 89–116.
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He impotently tries to foreclose interpretive multiplicity by claiming the leaf as his
own resource: unlike the always-circulating Mede, he has read until the end of the
text, asserting textual closure to repress his own equivocal openness. In contrast,
Chaucer ostensibly offers a comforting conclusion to his tale, in which “taillynge
enough” and the tale’s end occur simultaneously. The pun is rendered mutually sufﬁcient, the end of life/leaf truly one in which marital harmony and proper erotic exchange can be resumed, but the unhappy marital and signiﬁcatory equivocation of
Mede and Conscience lurks, like a whitewashed text, just behind it.
Jamie Taylor is Associate Professor at Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010 (e-mail:
jktaylor@brynmawr.edu)

6. The Medieval Liar
By G y u l a K l i m a

The Liar Paradox

In a philosophical context, when we are talking about “the Liar” or “the Liar Paradox” we are referring to a puzzling proposition claiming its own falsity (along with
some piece of reasoning pointing out the puzzling character of such a claim), which
raises some serious questions about the consistency of our ordinary notion of truth.
Accordingly, the name is somewhat misleading. The Liar Paradox has nothing to do
with the psychological conditions of lying, such as the beliefs and intentions of the
speaker (for telling a lie is of course not simply saying a falsity, but rather it is saying
something contrary to what one believes to be true with the intention to deceive),
or with its ethical problems (for example, whether lying is always impermissible);
rather, as it is commonly understood among philosophers, it is a problem of logical
semantics.
If I say that I am lying, or, to dispense with the logically irrelevant factors of beliefs, intentions, and moral values, if I say that what I am now saying is false, is what
I just said true or false? Clearly, what I said must be either true or false (but not
both). However, if it is true, then it is false, because that is just what I said to be
the case, and so it is not true; on the other hand, if it is false, then it is true, because
then what I just said to be the case is not the case, so it is not the case that what I said
is false, whence it must be true. So, what I just said has to be true if and only if it is not
true, which of course cannot be the case.
A Brief History of the Paradox in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy
The ﬁrst formulations and attempted solutions of the Liar Paradox can be traced
back to ancient philosophy. Eubulides the Megarian (fourth century BC) was ﬁrst
credited by Diogenes Laertius with discussing the paradox, which actually does not
mean that Eubulides was the ﬁrst to invent it. In fact, the paradox is also associated
with Epimenides of Knossos (or the Cretan) a semimythical ﬁgure who supposedly
lived in the seventh or sixth century BC. The source of this association seems to be
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